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The influence of political risk, inertia and imitative behavior on the location 
choice of Chinese multinational enterprises: does state ownership matter? 
Abstract 
Purpose – Drawing on the institutional perspective, this study investigates how state 
ownership moderates the relationships between political risk, inertia, and mimetic behavior, 
and the location choice of Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs). 
Design/methodology/approach – We argue that state ownership leads Chinese firms to 
behave toward political risk in an unconventional way, and that government support makes 
them less dependent on their own and other Chinese firms’ prior host country experience. We 
tested our hypotheses using data on outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) decisions made 
by 186 Chinese firms in 93 countries. 
Findings – We found that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), compared to non-SOEs, 
are more likely to move into countries with high political risk, and that they are less likely to 
be inertial and mimetic. 
Originality/value – Building on the distinction between macro and micro political risk, we 
contribute to the political risk literature by developing several arguments that explains why 
political risk varies across investing firms in a given host country. Moreover, this is one of the 
first studies of its kind to investigate the moderating effect of state ownership on the 
relationship between inertial and mimetic behavior, and the location choice of Chinese MNEs. 
Keywords Chinese firms; cross-border investments; location decisions. 
Paper type Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
Location decisions of multinational enterprises (MNEs) have received considerable attention 
from both scholars and practitioners as the choice of overseas location has the potential to 
either enhance or reduce firm performance (Jain et al., 2016). Over the recent years, the rising 
prominence of emerging-market MNEs is reshaping the global landscape. Since they exhibit 
distinct behaviors and growth strategies from those of their developed-country counterparts, 
the assumptions underlying traditional theories need to be re-evaluated in order to investigate 
how the distinctive attributes of emerging-market MNEs may affect their international 
expansion (Kim & Aguilera, 2016). 
China is the most prominent within this trend of outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI) from emerging economies, with some Chinese MNEs carrying out significant cross-
border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The leading role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
in this process has been one of the distinctive characteristics since the very beginning. It is 
estimated that Chinese SOEs are responsible for about three-quarters of China’s OFDI stock 
(Sauvant, 2013). Regarding this governance structure, two recent literature reviews on foreign 
location choice suggest that non-market factors such as government ownership or connections 
to the government may be critical in determining location decisions of emerging-market 
MNEs (Jain et al., 2016; Kim & Aguilera, 2016). 
Firms entering a host market face a high level of uncertainty stemming from several 
host country factors. Among these host country determinants of location choice, political risk 
has been extensively researched in the case of Chinese MNEs (Buckley et al., 2007, 2016; 
Duanmu & Guney, 2009; Guo et al., 2014; Han et al., 2014; Kang & Jiang, 2012; Kolstad & 
Wiig, 2012; Lv & Spigarelli, 2016; Quer et al., 2012). However, empirical evidence about 
how state ownership moderates the influence of political risk on location decisions of Chinese 
MNEs is still scant (Amighini et al., 2012; Duanmu, 2012, 2014; Ramasamy et al., 2012).  
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Moreover, Yuan and Pangarkar (2010, 2016) report that managers of Chinese MNEs 
can address the uncertainty in foreign market entry by either repeating their past choices 
(inertial behavior) or by imitating other companies (mimetic behavior). Nevertheless, they did 
not analyze the moderating effect of state ownership on the proposed relationships between 
inertial and mimetic behavior and location choice of Chinese MNEs. 
This paper aims to fill these research gaps by exploring the role of state ownership in 
Chinese MNEs’ location decisions. More precisely, we analyze the relationships between 
state ownership and host country political risk, inertia and imitative behavior, and how these 
relationships affect Chinese MNEs’ location choice.  
We make several contributions to the international business literature. First, we show 
that firms from the same home country, due to their particular characteristics, do not face the 
same political risk in a host country and do not have the same dependence on their own prior 
decision-specific experience or on other home country firms’ prior experience in the host 
country. 
Second, this study also contributes to the empirical research on emerging-market 
MNEs, in particular, those from China. Although the internationalization of Chinese firms is 
receiving increasing attention among international business scholars (Enderwick, 2017; 
Qunyong, 2017), there are still some gaps in the literature, and further research is needed to 
extend our knowledge of Chinese MNEs. Some previous papers have analyzed the role of 
state ownership in several Chinese OFDI issues (Quer et al., 2015). However, as stated above, 
only a few of them have explored the moderating effect of state ownership on the locational 
determinants of Chinese MNEs. In addition, by including state ownership as a moderating 
variable, we try to shed light on the unconventional behavior of Chinese MNEs’ location 
decisions reported in prior empirical research that has not distinguished between Chinese 
SOEs and non-SOEs. In doing so, we also seek to provide new insights to the ownership-
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location-internalization (OLI) model (Dunning, 1981), by analyzing how state ownership may 
be a source of ownership advantages, as well as a mechanism to reduce perceptions of both 
transaction costs and location disadvantages. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we propose several hypotheses on the above-
mentioned moderating effects of state ownership. Then, we present the methodology used for 
our empirical research, based on a sample of Chinese OFDI decisions. After discussing the 
main findings, we conclude by outlining the main contributions and limitations of our study, 
as well as by suggesting future research directions on this topic. 
 
2. Theory and hypotheses development 
2.1 Political risk 
Host country political risk is one of the most researched institutional factors affecting location 
decisions of MNEs. From a regulative institutional perspective, it is expected that MNEs will 
locate in countries where regulative institutional constraints are less repressive to foreign 
investments (Kang & Jiang, 2012). The political and legal regime is one of the main 
dimensions of these regulative institutions. The high degree of uncertainty associated with 
foreign ownership or increased asset exposure in the event of an eventual expropriation can 
hinder OFDI decisions (Brouthers, 2002; Pak & Park, 2004). MNEs with superior proprietary 
assets face greater hazards of intellectual property appropriation as well as higher 
expropriation risk when the host country does not provide strong property rights protection 
(Jiang et al., 2014). Thus, the conventional wisdom suggests that high political risk is 
negatively related to OFDI location, given that MNEs will be more reluctant to enter 
countries with an unstable environment.  
However, there are arguments that challenge this view and suggest that not all foreign 
firms face the same political risk in a host country. One of the most widely accepted 
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definitions of political risk is that of Simon (1982: 68), who defines it as "governmental or 
societal actions and policies, originating either within or outside the host country, and 
negatively affecting either a select group of, or the majority of, foreign business operations 
and investments". This definition is interesting because it suggests that political risk may vary 
across investing firms in a given host country. Actually, Robock (1971: 9) was the first to 
introduce a distinction between a macro political risk ("when unanticipated and politically 
motivated environmental changes are broadly directed at all foreign enterprise") and a micro 
political risk ("when the environmental changes are intended to affect only selected fields of 
business activity or foreign enterprises with specific characteristics"). This differentiation 
between macro and micro nature of political risk is important since some events may have 
different impact depending on industry- and firm-specific factors. While macro risks are 
environmental events which affect all foreign firms in a country without regard to 
organizational characteristics, micro risks are industry, firm, and even project-specific 
(Kobrin, 1981). However, prior empirical research mainly focused on the macro dimension of 
political risk, paying less attention to the micro dimension.  
Furthermore, several factors, such as the contribution of the firm to the local economy 
(Juhl, 1985; Rice & Mahmoud, 1990), may moderate the impact of the general environment 
on each firm particular political risk exposure (Alon & Herbert, 2009). Political risk involves 
several factors, such as expropriation hazard, rules, regulations, security issues, fiscal policies, 
trade barriers, etc. Anyway, the magnitude of their effect may vary from one firm to another 
depending on firm-specific characteristics (Alon et al., 2006; Alon & Herbert, 2009). First, 
firm-specific capabilities for coping with political risk may play a determinant role (Frynas & 
Mellahi, 2003; Jiménez et al., 2014). In particular, emerging-market MNEs can build specific 
capabilities for coping with a politically uncertain territory. They suffer the competitive 
disadvantage of operating in a home country with an underdeveloped institutional 
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environment. However, this disadvantage can turn into an advantage when doing business in 
host countries with similar weak institutional environments (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). 
Facing such uncertainty at home has helped some emerging-market MNEs to develop 
capabilities for coping with risk and political uncertainty. Therefore, these firms may use the 
home country specific circumstances to develop firm-specific advantages. 
Moreover, the nationality of the investing firm may also affect political risk exposure, 
depending on the diplomatic relations between home and host countries (De la Torre & 
Neckar, 1988). As Simon (1984) points out, when a MNE invests in a given host country, it 
enters the world of that country and the risks it will face will depend upon the interactions of 
key actors, which can have indirect external risks, including the effect of deteriorating 
relations between the home and the host country. Ultimately, MNEs represent their home 
country and strained diplomatic relations with the host country may lead to hostility and 
unfair treatment by the host government, thus increasing political risk (Alon & Herbert, 2009). 
Some empirical papers on Chinese MNEs supported the conventional view that host 
country political risk discourages their OFDI, because of the above-mentioned factors, i.e., 
institutional constraints, high degree of uncertainty, lack of property rights protection or 
hazard of expropriation (Duanmu, 2012, 2014; Duanmu & Guney, 2009; Guo et al., 2014; Lv 
& Spigarelli, 2016). Anyway, there is also empirical evidence suggesting that host country 
risks do not affect Chinese MNEs in a conventional way. Buckley et al. (2007, 2016) found 
no evidence to support that Chinese OFDI was associated negatively with rising levels of host 
country political risk. Similarly, Quer et al. (2012) reported that a high political risk in the 
host country did no discourage Chinese MNEs. Kolstad and Wiig (2012) found that Chinese 
OFDI was attracted to countries with a combination of large natural resources and poor 
institutions. Other papers even report that Chinese MNEs tend to locate in countries that are 
politically risky (Han et al., 2014; Kang & Jiang, 2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012). 
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Some researchers have provided arguments for these unconventional findings drawing 
on the above-mentioned bilateral diplomatic relations between China and particular host 
countries. Thus, Buckley et al. (2007, 2016) point out that some Chinese OFDIs have been 
located in countries with which China has close political and ideological ties, many of which 
have a high political risk. Li and Liang (2012) argue that Chinese firms tend to go to high-risk 
host countries, not because of their risk acceptant preference, but rather because of the risk-
reduction effect of good political relationships between China and the host country. In a 
similar way, Li et al. (2013) report that by building good relationships with the host country 
and representing Chinese companies to bargain with the host government, the Chinese 
government may reduce the risk level facing Chinese companies doing business in that 
country. As Child and Marinova (2014) suggest, the active involvement of the Chinese 
government in Chinese firms’ internationalization can extend to bilateral agreements than can 
stabilize host country environments for Chinese firms. Thus, bilateral diplomatic relations 
between China and the host country may play a role (Zhang et al., 2014), since they serve as a 
risk-reduction device, especially for SOEs (Duanmu, 2014). Following a similar reasoning, 
Gao et al. (2015) argue that the political relations between China and the host country may 
influence the impact of host country institutions on market expansion of Chinese SOEs.  
Some scholars have provided other explanations for these unconventional findings. Ge 
and Ding (2009) suggest that some Chinese MNEs select investment locations mainly based 
on their own strategic objectives, disregarding political risk or psychic distance, in an attempt 
to catch up with incumbent developed-country MNEs (Luo & Tung, 2007). Chinese MNEs 
are usually latecomers to the industry in which they compete. For that reason, they have to 
accelerate their internationalization pace with the aim of accessing resources and capabilities 
that are not available in their home country (Mathews, 2002). This is considered a distinctive 
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characteristic of emerging-market MNEs that try to overcome their latecomer disadvantages 
through aggressive and risk-taking cross-border acquisitions (Kedia et al., 2012). 
In addition, Kang and Jiang (2012) point out that Chinese MNEs try to exploit 
opportunities in countries where developed-country MNEs might regard as too risky. 
Focusing on the very idiosyncrasy of China’s own institutional framework, Buckley et al. 
(2007, 2016) also provide additional arguments. They suggest that Chinese firms do not 
perceive or behave toward risk in the same way as firms from industrialized countries, 
demonstrating a perverse attitude to risk. First, because of imperfections in the Chinese 
capital market, the cost of capital is lower for Chinese firms, in particular, for SOEs. Second, 
because they are subject to Chinese government institutional influences, they may not behave 
only as profit-maximizers. Similarly, Rudy et al. (2016) point out that SOEs are likely to 
display a greater risk appetite, as a result of their soft budget constraint derived from their 
relationship with the state. 
We propose that state ownership may put Chinese firms in a better position to take 
advantage of all the above opportunities. The government as owner of the MNE can tolerate 
higher risk in cross-border transactions compared to a private owner. Managers of SOEs can 
enter host countries that are considered too risky for privately-owned MNEs because of the 
protection they enjoy from the home government (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014): the home 
government can bail SOEs out if they run into difficulties, and it can use political 
relationships and diplomacy to reduce potential expropriation risks.  
In fact, some papers dealing with the location determinants of Chinese OFDI have 
reported differences between SOEs and private firms regarding political risk influence. 
Duanmu (2012, 2014) found that Chinese SOEs, compared to non-SOEs, are less concerned 
about host country political risk, while Amighini et al. (2012) and Ramasamy et al. (2012) 
reported that Chinese SOEs are attracted to countries with natural resources and risky political 
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environments. As stated above, a softer budget constraint, a behavior not only as pure profit-
maximizers since they usually pursue policy goals, and the protection from the home 
government, in particular that derived from bilateral diplomatic relations, provides Chinese 
SOEs with advantages over their privately-owned counterparts when investing in politically 
risky locations. All these arguments lead us to propose: 
Hypothesis 1: State ownership moderates the negative effect of political risk on the 
location of Chinese OFDI, in that SOEs are more likely to move into countries with 
high political risk. 
2.2 Inertial behavior 
According to the institutional theory, organizational imprinting refers to the process of 
institutionalization by which organizations tend to maintain certain structural features and 
practices over time (Zucker, 1977). With organizational imprinting, once a decision has been 
implemented, the likelihood of alternatives for future decisions is reduced (Lu, 2002). This 
argument may also be related to the notion of behavioral inertia from an ecological 
perspective. The population ecology theory suggests that since organizational changes are 
risky, firms are subject to strong inertial forces; in other words, they seldom succeed in 
making radical strategic and structural changes when facing environmental threats (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977; 1984). Drawing on this perspective, inertia may be defined as the tendency to 
routinely repeat past actions and patterns of activities (Jansen, 2004).  
In the context of OFDI location choice, these ideas are connected with a particular 
type of international experience, namely, decision-specific experience, suggesting that, faced 
with uncertainty, firms will repeat their past selections. Thus, when choosing OFDI location, 
inertial forces will encourage MNEs to rely on organizational routines and discourage them 
from selecting a new host country where they have no prior experience (Yuan & Pangarkar, 
2010). In fact, when analyzing location strategies, Jiang et al. (2014) found that a large 
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number of prior entries by the focal firm were associated with a higher probability of future 
investments in the same country. 
When firms enter a new host market, they usually face a high level of uncertainty and 
they must overcome the liability of foreignness, or the additional costs that a company must 
face when entering a host market for the first time (Zaheer, 1995). The lack of institutional 
market knowledge – about language, laws, and rules – is associated not only with psychic 
distance but also with the liability of foreignness (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009).  
Knowledge about the host country informs foreign entry decisions (Lu et al., 2014). If 
the firm has been doing business in a particular host country for a long time or if it has 
already established subsidiaries, it will probably have a deeper knowledge of that host 
environment. Several prior studies reported a positive association between host country 
specific experience and resource commitment (Chang & Rosenzweig, 2001; Luo, 2001; Yu, 
1990). Therefore, host-country specific experience may help firms to overcome the liability of 
foreignness, which in turn helps them to apply past decision-specific experience (Lu, 2002; 
Luo & Peng, 1999). 
In the case of Chinese OFDI, empirical evidence for the impact of inertial behavior on 
location choice is still scant. Yuan and Pangarkar (2010, 2016) reported that prior selections 
of the particular host country by the focal firm increased the likelihood that the focal firm may 
undertake future OFDI in the same location. This is also facilitated through an ongoing 
learning process and knowledge creation about the location (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009) and 
local customers (Hertenstein et al., 2017; Hobdari et al, 2017). 
However, Yuan and Pangarkar (2010, 2016) did not address the potential moderating 
effect of state ownership. State ownership may influence firm willingness and ability to carry 
out OFDI. MNEs with a lower degree of state ownership depend less on the government as 
resource provider (Wang et al., 2012). Chinese non-SOEs, compared to their SOE 
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counterparts, must rely only on their own resources and capabilities when doing business 
abroad. Most of the large SOEs enjoy certain privileges such as government-supported 
finance, subsidies, regulations or monopolistic position at home (Song et al., 2011). Thus, 
government ownership can be a source of firm-specific advantages when it provides SOEs 
with funds for investments or diplomatic support to deal with foreign governments (Cuervo-
Cazurra et al., 2014). 
Thanks to the access to these strategic assets, Chinese SOEs may be more confident 
and less risk averse when entering a new host country. Thus, when choosing a new location, 
Chinese SOEs may be less dependent on their own prior decision-specific experience in the 
particular host country. In view of these arguments, we propose: 
Hypothesis 2: State ownership negatively moderates the effect of behavioral inertia 
on the location of Chinese OFDI, in that SOEs are less likely to be inertial compared 
to non-SOEs. 
2.3 Mimetic behavior 
Isomorphism is another key element of institutional theory. It refers to a process that forces 
one organization to resemble others that face similar environmental conditions (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). Institutional theory posits that organizations seek approval or legitimacy from 
their peers. Hence, faced with uncertainty, organizations tend to behave in ways that are 
consistent with the actions of other organizations within their institutional environment 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Mimetic behavior or frequency imitation (copying very common 
practices) is a type of institutional isomorphism by which organizations execute practices 
previously used by other organizations (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). 
Mimetic behavior has been used in prior studies focusing on market entry decisions. 
Haveman (1993) found that organizations tend to follow similar and successful organizations 
into new markets. Henisz and Delios (2001) reported that the probability of locating a plant in 
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a given country would be greater the greater the number of prior locations by other firms. 
Jiang et al. (2014) found that the negative impact of formal and informal institutional distance 
between host and home countries on OFDI location choice was mitigated by the experience of 
other home country firms in that host country. Similarly, Jiménez and de la Fuente (2016) 
showed that a larger number of firms from the same home country in a host country positively 
moderate the negative influence of a greater psychic distance on the location of a MNE’s 
subsidiary, both for firms belonging to the same industry and to different industries.  
This is related to the concept of ‘vicarious experience’, i.e., the foreign investment 
experience of other firms that share a common characteristic, providing the MNE with 
information about the formal and informal institutional environments of a host country, which 
enhances MNE’s ability to manage subsidiary operations in institutionally distant locations 
(Jiang et al., 2014). One such common characteristic may be the same home country, since 
such compatriot firms will face the same or similar difficulties when investing in a host 
country (Tan & Meyer, 2011). Besides, shared beliefs and a culturally-similar background 
make it easier for the investing firm to infer from and absorb the experience of companies 
from the same country of origin (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
As in the case of inertial behavior, empirical evidence for the influence of mimetic 
behavior on location choice of Chinese MNEs is still scant. Yuan and Pangarkar (2010, 2016) 
also reported that prior selections of the particular host country by other Chinese firms 
increased the likelihood that the focal firm entered the same host country in future decisions. 
However, they did not address the potential moderating effect of state ownership either. 
Following a similar reasoning as above, we argue that state ownership may moderate 
the relationship between imitative behavior and location choice. Thanks to the privileges they 
enjoy, Chinese SOEs may be more confident and less risk averse when making foreign 
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market entry decisions. Thus, when entering a new host country, Chinese SOEs may be less 
dependent on other Chinese firms’ prior experience in that host country.  
Furthermore, similarities between firms may encourage mimetic behavior. In this case, 
compatriot firms with a similar ownership structure may be considered a particularly relevant 
reference group for imitation. However, companies from the same home country with 
different ownership types may vary in their propensity to imitate. Thus, Xie and Li (2017) 
report that Chinese SOEs are less likely to imitate compared with their privately-owned 
compatriots. This lower tendency to imitate may be explained by the fact that Chinese SOEs 
tend to have different incentives and strategic goals than privately-owned ones, including to 
achieve the political objectives of their home government. This may lead them to be 
perceived as political actors, rather than pure business entities, thus increasing resistance in 
many host countries (Huang et al., 2017). For that reason, Chinese SOEs may be reluctant to 
imitate the previous strategic choices of state-owned peers (Xie & Li, 2017). As a 
consequence, we propose: 
Hypothesis 3: State ownership negatively moderates the effect of mimetic behavior 
on the location of Chinese OFDI, in that SOEs are less likely to be mimetic compared 
to non-SOEs. 
 
3. Data and method 
3.1 Data collection 
We collected our data from several secondary sources: the China Global Investment Tracker 
(created by The Heritage Foundation, which provides a comprehensive dataset of large 
Chinese investments and contracts worldwide), news items published on some Chinese 
newspapers (such as China Daily and Global Times) as well as information from each 
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company’s corporate website. Finally, we obtained 489 OFDIs made by 186 Chinese firms in 
93 countries between 2005 and 2013, this being the sample for our study. 
The top destination is the US, with 67 OFDIs, followed by Australia (57), Canada (29), 
Brazil (24), Russia (24) and the UK (20). China National Petroleum Corporation [CNPC] 
leads the ranking of top investing companies, with 32 OFDIs, followed by Sinopec (27), 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation [CNOOC] (15) and Sinochem (10). The main 
industries included in our sample are mining (26.3%), engineering and construction (10.2%), 
automotive (9.7%) and finance (5.9%). Regarding ownership type, 99 companies are SOEs 
(53.2%), while the remaining 87 (46.8%) are non-SOEs. 
3.2 Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is the location decision by firm i about an investment in country j. It 
was proxied by a dummy variable: (1) if firm i invests in country j; (0) otherwise (Duanmu, 
2012; Henisz & Delios, 2001; Jiménez & de la Fuente, 2016; Quer et al., 2012; Yuan & 
Pangarkar, 2010). 
3.3 Independent variables 
Political risk.  We measured this variable using the political risk rating of the International 
Country Risk Guide (PRS, 2013). This measure has been used in prior studies on Chinese 
OFDI (Buckley et al., 2007, 2016; Duanmu, 2012; Duanmu & Guney, 2009; Han et al., 2014; 
Quer et al., 2012). 
Inertial behavior. This variable was proxied by the number of prior investments by each firm 
in each particular country (Jiang et al., 2014; Lu et al., 2014; Luo, 2001; Yuan & Pangarkar, 
2010). 
Mimetic behavior. Following previous studies on vicarious experience (Jiang et al., 2014; 
Jiménez & de la Fuente, 2016), this variable was proxied by the number of prior investments 
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by other Chinese firms, excluding the focal firm, in the particular country (Lu et al., 2014; 
Yuan & Pangarkar, 2010). 
3.4 Moderator 
State ownership. We used a dummy variable as a moderator: (1) if SOE; (0) otherwise (Cui & 
Jiang, 2012; Duanmu, 2012; Li et al., 2016; Liu & Scott-Kennel, 2011; Pangarkar & Yuan, 
2009). 
3.5 Control variables 
We controlled for a number of factors that might influence location decisions of Chinese 
MNEs. When MNEs enter an institutional environment with a different set of rules, they must 
build social legitimacy. The difficulty in attaining this is mainly related to cultural distance 
between home and host countries (Cui & Jiang, 2009, 2010). However, empirical evidence 
regarding the influence of cultural distance is not conclusive in the case of Chinese firms. 
While some papers found that Chinese OFDI is associated with cultural proximity to host 
countries (Blomkvist & Drogendijk, 2013; Buckley et al., 2007, 2016; Kang & Jiang, 2012) 
other studies reported that cultural distance does not have a strong negative influence on the 
location of Chinese OFDI (Quer et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2016). Thus, we included cultural 
distance as a control variable, measured by the Kogut and Singh (1988) index, using the 
extended Hofstede’s model with six dimensions (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
Host market characteristics are widely recognized factors that affect investment 
inflows to a country. Over recent years, market seeking has been one of the main driving 
factors of Chinese OFDI (Buckley et al., 2008; Voss et al., 2010). It is expected that fast 
growing economies provide more market opportunities than others that are growing slowly or 
are in recession. However, empirical evidence is not conclusive in the case of Chinese MNEs 
either. Kang and Jiang (2012) only obtained partial support for the positive influence of host 
market growth on the location choice of Chinese OFDI, while Buckley et al. (2007, 2016) 
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found no relationship, and Duanmu and Guney (2009) reported that Chinese OFDI was 
attracted to countries with low market growth. Thus, we also controlled for host market 
growth, measured by GDP growth (annual %), using data from The World Bank, to capture 
the market potential of a host economy. 
The level of development of the host country may also influence location decisions of 
MNEs. The strength of a country’s institutional framework reduces business costs for foreign 
companies. In many emerging economies, institutional weakness may amplify information 
asymmetries, so companies face greater risks and need to spend more resources to search for 
information (Meyer et al., 2009). To control for this, we included developed country as a 
dummy variable taking the value of (1) if the host country is a developed country and (0) 
otherwise. In doing so, we followed the classification of the International Monetary Fund 
(Yang et al., 2013). 
Resource-seeking has been one of the traditional motivations of Chinese OFDI. Over 
recent years, because of the rapid economic growth of the Chinese economy, there has been 
an increasing emphasis on oil, gas and raw materials for many industries. Most of the key 
players have been SOEs, which enjoy strong support from the Chinese government (Buckley 
et al., 2008). Thus, we included a dummy variable regarding the motive of each investment: 
(1) if resource-seeking; (0) otherwise. The investment was included in the resource-seeking 
category if the investing company belonged to a mining, metal or oil and gas industry and its 
aim was to access a local resource, usually in a country rich in raw materials. 
Voss et al. (2010) found that differences in local home government attitude play a role, 
since differences regarding the speed of the OFDI approval process exist among Chinese 
regions. This leads them to suggest that OFDI is better supported in China’s eastern coastal 
regions, the traditional poles of Chinese economic growth. Similarly, Liu et al. (2014) 
confirm that well-developed regional institutional environments in China positively affect the 
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extent of Chinese firms’ OFDI. Sun et al. (2015) argue that greater institutional open access in 
a particular Chinese region leads to a greater outward internationalization of local firms 
headquartered in that region. Furthermore, Wu and Chen (2014) find that the level of 
institutional development in the home Chinese region is positively associated with location in 
advanced foreign markets. Thus, we controlled for the intra-Chinese institutional differences. 
Using data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, this variable was proxied by the 
GDP per capita of the Chinese province, region or municipality where the firm’s headquarters 
are located (with a log transformation). 
 
4. Results and discussion 
As stated above, our dependent variable was given a value of (1) if firm i invests in country j, 
and (0) otherwise. Since we study the decision of location or non-location of a firm in a 
particular country, we have 17,298 observations (186 firms x 93 countries). We tested our 
hypotheses using a conditional logistic regression model, which is appropriate in situations 
where choice attributes and decision maker’s characteristics may have an impact on the 
outcome. This model has been used in prior empirical studies on Chinese OFDI location 
choice (Duanmu, 2012; Quer et al., 2012; Yuan & Pangarkar, 2010; Zheng et al., 2016). 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and correlations while Table 2 shows the results 
of the conditional logistic regression for location choice.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Insert Table 2 about here 
We used different models to test the hypotheses. Model 1 performed the regression 
considering only control variables. The model is significant (p<0.001) and four control 
variables became significant with a positive effect on location choice: cultural distance, 
developed country, resource-seeking, and intra-Chinese institutional differences. Model 2 
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included the direct effects of political risk, inertia, imitative behavior and state ownership, this 
model being also statistically significant (p<0.001). This model returned a statistically 
significant negative effect of political risk on location decisions (p<0.001), whereas a 
statistically significant positive effect of inertia, imitative behavior and state ownership (all 
with p<0.001). 
Models 3-6 tested the hypotheses regarding the moderating effects of state ownership. 
All of these models were statistically significant (p<0.001). Models 3, 4 and 5 included the 
interaction effects independently, while model 6 included all of them. The interaction term 
between political risk and state ownership was positive and significant both in model 3 
(β=0.03, p<0.01) and model 6 (β=0.02, p<0.05). These findings suggest that Chinese SOEs 
are more likely to undertake OFDI in countries with high political risk than Chinese non-
SOEs. Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported. These findings are consistent with those of Amighini 
et al. (2012), Duanmu (2012, 2014) and Ramasamy et al. (2012) who found that Chinese 
SOEs were less risk averse compared to their non-SOEs counterparts. Moreover, our results 
may provide a justification for other empirical studies reporting that host country risk does not 
affect Chinese MNEs in a conventional way (Buckley et al., 2007, 2016; Kang & Jiang, 2012; 
Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Quer et al., 2012). Some of them even found that Chinese firms 
demonstrated a perverse attitude toward risk in comparison with developed-country MNEs. 
However, the latter studies did not explicitly consider the moderating effect of state 
ownership on the relationships between determinants and location choice. Thus, the inclusion 
of state ownership as a moderating variable may help to shed light on the unconventional 
behavior of Chinese MNEs when making location decisions. 
The interaction term between inertia and state ownership was negative and highly 
significant both in model 4 (β=-2.41, p<0.001) and model 6 (β=-2.34, p<0.001). These 
findings suggest a negative moderating effect of state ownership on the relationship between 
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inertial behavior (prior investments by the firm in each host country) and the likelihood that 
the firm will enter this host country. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is strongly supported. 
The interaction term between mimetic behavior and state ownership was negative both 
in models 5 and 6, but only became statistically significant in model 5 (β=-0.02, p<0.05). 
These results suggest a negative moderating effect of state ownership on the relationship 
between imitative behavior (prior investments by other Chinese firms in each host country) 
and the likelihood that the location will be chosen. However, the lack of significance in the 
final model leads us to consider hypothesis 3 as partially supported.  
In this case, a comparison between the results regarding hypotheses 2 and 3, and those 
obtained in previous studies on Chinese MNEs is difficult to make. As stated above, empirical 
evidence for inertial and mimetic behavior on Chinese OFDI location is scant. The positive 
direct effects of inertial and mimetic behavior reported in models 2-6 are consistent with the 
findings of Yuan and Pangarkar (2010, 2016), i.e. that past choices of the particular host 
country by the focal firm and other Chinese firms will increase the likelihood that the focal 
firm will select the same host country in future location decisions. Nevertheless, since they 
did not analyze the potential moderating effect of state ownership, a comparison with our 
results suggesting that Chinese SOEs tend to be less inertial and mimetic, is not possible. 
With regard to the control variables, two of them turned out to be statistically 
significant in all models. First, the dummy variable resource-seeking showed a positive 
significant effect on the location decision of Chinese MNEs. Thus, belonging to a mining, 
metal or oil and gas industry is positively associated with the decision to carry out OFDI in a 
particular host country. As we pointed out above, the search for resources such as oil, gas or 
raw materials has been one of the traditional driving factors of China’s OFDI, in particular, 
for Chinese SOEs. 
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Second, the variable intra-Chinese institutional differences (proxied by the GDP per 
capita) also showed a positive significant effect in all the regressions. This result suggests that 
the firm’s home region may have influenced OFDI location decisions. In particular, it is 
expected that firm’s decisions will be facilitated if OFDI is better supported in the home 
region, something that may occur in the east side of China, the traditional engine of China’s 
economic growth over the past 30 years. In fact, descriptive statistics reveal that firms whose 
headquarters are located in Beijing (northern China), Shanghai, Shandong, Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang (eastern coastal regions) and Guangdong (southern China) account for 68.8% of the 
investors included in our sample. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper aimed to contribute to the study of Chinese MNEs’ behavior by analyzing if 
Chinese SOEs respond to external institutional factors in a different way compared to their 
non-SOEs counterparts when choosing an OFDI location. In doing so, we also contribute to 
the study of OFDI location, one of the most important decisions of MNEs. As Deng (2013) 
suggests, since the prevailing theories mainly focus on privately-owned firms, a fruitful 
research avenue might be to consider how and to what extent Chinese state ownership might 
advance FDI theories and firm conduct in the global landscape.  
From a theoretical standpoint, we aimed to advance institutional theory in international 
business research by analyzing how state ownership moderates the relationships between 
some host country institutional factors and OFDI location decisions. As Jain et al. (2016) 
point out in their literature review on location decisions, how does government structure (e.g., 
being an SOE) determine location choice remains an under-researched area. Actually, 
Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2014) argue that the SOE dimension of state-owned MNEs may extend 
the MNE literature in answering the question on where to invest abroad. Thus, they point out 
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that whereas the traditional explanation suggests that MNEs tend to select a country in which 
resources and capabilities are more easily applicable to achieve higher profitability, state-
owned MNEs may select a country in which the home government wants to achieve influence 
or diplomacy even if that location offers limited business benefits. 
An interesting element of our study is the notion that firms from the same country do 
not face the same political risk in another country due to their particular characteristics. This 
idea has important theoretical implications for the political risk literature. Drawing on the 
distinction between macro and micro political risk, we have developed some arguments that 
explains why political risk varies across investing firms in a given host country, adding 
something new to the political risk literature. Academic research on micro political risk is still 
scant, since most of the research to date has focused on macro political risk (Alon & Herbert, 
2009). Micro political risk assessment should be performed at the industry – or even at the 
firm – level, while most authors, when they write about political risk in general, they refer to 
macro political risk (Sottilotta, 2013).  
Furthermore, we have provided new empirical evidence on the behavior of Chinese 
MNEs, which are becoming key players in the global economy over recent years. In particular, 
to the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first papers to analyze the moderating effect of 
state ownership on the relationship between inertial and mimetic behavior, and the location 
choice of Chinese MNEs. Our results suggest that Chinese SOEs, compared to non-SOEs, are 
more likely to move into countries with high political risk, and they are less likely to be 
inertial and mimetic. However, the last moderating effect showed less statistical significance. 
As stated above, good diplomatic relations between China and the host country, the attempt to 
catch up with incumbent developed-country MNEs, the aim to exploit opportunities in 
countries regarded as risky by developed-country MNEs, or the very idiosyncrasy of China’s 
institutional framework are some of the reasons behind the unconventional behavior of 
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Chinese SOEs when entering host countries with a higher political risk. Regarding inertial and 
mimetic behavior, the Chinese government provides SOEs with strategic support making 
them less dependent on their own and other Chinese firms’ past experience in the host country. 
In addition to contributing to the academic literature on Chinese MNEs and location 
choice, this study also has several managerial implications. Some Chinese MNEs have carried 
out significant cross-border M&As and are becoming leading global players in many 
industries from oil and gas to automotive, engineering, construction, and finance. Managers of 
companies from other countries, in particular those of developed-country MNEs, must know 
how these emerging global players make decisions when doing business abroad. Furthermore, 
since many Chinese MNEs are also SOEs, it is necessary to analyze if their behavior differs 
from that of their non-SOEs counterparts, and if it deviates from the conventional wisdom, 
mainly derived from developed-country MNEs. The findings from this study lead us to 
consider that this is true at least with regard to location choice decisions. More precisely, 
government support makes Chinese SOEs less risk averse when entering a new host country. 
Despite these contributions, this paper has several limitations that suggest potential 
directions for future research. First, since the percentage of equity ownership by the Chinese 
government was not available for all the firms included in our sample, we measured state 
ownership using a dummy variable. Different levels of state ownership might influence the 
relationships analyzed in this paper, leading to a different result in some cases. As Inoue et al. 
(2013) argue, companies with a minority state ownership are less affected by the agency 
distortions commonly present in full-fledged SOEs. Thus, future research could explore if 
fully SOEs behave in a different way compared to firms with a lower percentage of state 
ownership. 
Second, our research setting has been China, whose OFDI activities show distinctive 
characteristics that may have influenced our findings. How SOEs from other emerging 
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economies behave regarding political risk, inertial and imitative behavior still remains 
underexplored. A comparison among Chinese, Indian or Latin American SOEs is another 
interesting avenue for future research in order to explore if the arguments presented here are 
generalizable to other emerging-market MNEs.  
Third, since micro political risk is the political risk affecting a particular firm, project, 
or industry, the unit of analysis should not only be the target country (as in macro political 
risk) but also the firm’s nationality, industry, or particular project characteristics and their 
relationship to the host country (Alon & Herbert, 2009). This would call into question the 
currently common approach, also used here, of compiling cross-country indices or indicators 
of political risk that are then supposed to apply to all foreign-owned firms. As Kobrin (1979) 
pointed out, aggregate quantitative indices ignore industry and firm specific factors, providing 
rankings that are independent of firm or industry factors, and measuring political instability 
rather than the potential impact of political risk upon specific types of firms. Although an 
index-based approach may be useful to establish to which class of risk a country belongs, 
micro risk approaches focusing on individual projects or firms are also necessary (Sottilotta, 
2013). Future research may overcome this limitation by using innovative ways for measuring 
micro political risk, thus considering more home country, industry, firm and even project 
variables that might affect particular political risk exposure. 
Finally, although prior research papers dealt with the role of state ownership in some 
Chinese OFDI issues, more work is needed to extend our knowledge of its influence on the 
internationalization of Chinese firms. Some questions remain open for future research. For 
instance, how does state ownership affect the establishment mode choice between acquisitions 
and greenfield investments? What role does it play on the choice between native or expatriate 
staff in foreign subsidiaries? Moreover, what differences exist between Chinese SOEs and 
non-SOEs when managing cultural integration in cross-border M&As? 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Cultural distance 2.30 0.98         
2. Host market growth 4.22 3.84 -0.32**        
3. Developed country 0.29 0.45  0.37** -0.42**       
4. Resource-seeking 0.34 0.47   0.00   0.00  0.00      
5. Intra-Chinese   
institutional differences 
3.99 0.20   0.00   0.00  0.00 -0.14**     
6. State ownership 0.53 0.50   0.00   0.00  0.00  0.17**  0.19**    
7. Political risk 61.15 12.94 -0.26**  0.32** -0.67**   0.00   0.00   0.00   
8. Inertial behavior 0.01 0.16  0.03** -0.02*  0.03**  0.03**  0.02**  0.03** -0.04**  
9. Mimetic behavior 5.02 9.26  0.19** -0.12**  0.27** -0.00  -0.01  -0.01 -0.29** 0.07** 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
an
be
rra
 A
t 0
6:
32
 0
2 
Ju
ne
 2
01
8 
(P
T)
34 
 
Table 2 Results of conditional logistic regression for location choice 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Control variables 
    Cultural distance 0.14* 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 
    Host market growth 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
    Developed country 0.78*** 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.25 
    Resource-seeking 0.53*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.41*** 0.38*** 0.41*** 
    Intra-Chinese institutional differences 1.23*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 1.01*** 0.92*** 1.01*** 
Direct effects 
    Political risk  -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.04*** 
    Inertial behavior  0.28*** 0.29*** 2.68*** 0.30*** 2.63*** 
    Mimetic behavior  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.02*** 0.02** 
Moderator 
    State ownership  0.48*** -0.96* 0.54*** 0.62*** -0.55 
Interactions 
    Political risk x State ownership   0.03**   0.02* 
    Inertia x State ownership    -2.41***  -2.34*** 
    Imitation x State ownership     -0.02* -0.01 
Chi-square 116.08*** 1637.85*** 1638.24*** 1831.64*** 1639.92*** 1832.08*** 
N 17,298 17,298 17,298 17,298 17,298 17,298 
Dependent variable: (1) Firm i invests in country j; (0) Otherwise. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
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